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Abstract
This paper examines the transactions demand for money in Chile
over the period from 1986 to 2000. Using systems cointegration meth-
ods suggested by Johansen (1995), we …nd that although macroe-
conomic data for Chile exhibit strong trend-stationarity during this
period it is possible to recover relatively robust single-equation spec-
i…cations for the transactions demand for money. Error-correction
models in which money demand is conditioned on real wealth, the
level of economic activity, and the nominal Central Bank policy rate
provide robust basis for inference. Controlling for a shift in velocity
in the end of 1998 the models exhibit a high-degree of out-of-sample
predictive power over the period from 1998 to mid 2000.
Key words: Money demand; wealth; vector error correction mod-
els; out-of-sample forecasting.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine the transactions demand for money
in Chile. To add to the already extensive literature on this topic requires
some justi…cation. The most prosaic justi…cation is simply that since the
Central Bank’s policy making relies heavily on assumptions about the de-
mand for money, regular review of the properties of this central behavioural
¤This paper was written following a visit to the Research Department of the Central
Bank of Chile in April 1999. I would like to thank Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel for his hospitality
and intellectual support during the visit. My thanks also go to Rodrigo Caputo, Luis-Oscar
Herrera, Oscar Landerretche, Norman Loyaza and Rodrigo Valdes for helpful discussion
and assistance. All opinions, errors, and failures to understand the workings of the Chilean
economy are my own.
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1relationship is a rather natural activity. However the paper is also moti-
vated by two additional features of the last decade. The …rst is that since
the establishment of an independent central bank in 19891, monetary policy
in Chile has been framed in terms of an “in‡ation-targeting” approach, in
which the authorities have pursued an in‡ation target through manipulation
of an indexed policy rate of interest (the so-called “policy rate”). Hence it is
important for the design of policy to examine the extent to which the private
sector’s demand for money responds to this policy rate: this represents a key
line of investigation running through the paper. The second additional fea-
ture is that following a extended period of un-interrupted and rapid growth,
the economy experienced a sharp recession from the …nal quarter of 1998
until mid-1999, before returning back on track in 2000. This recession, the
…rst experienced in the new regime, provides an interesting opportunity to
examine whether models estimated over the period of growth are capable of
forecasting money demand over this period.
These concerns create a natural shape to the paper. I start with a general
discussion of the question of speci…cation, before examining the dynamic
money demand equation used in the Bank’s own research (see for example,
Herrera and Caputo, 1998).2 As shall be seen, this speci…cation appears to
systematically over-estimate money demand, particularly in the late 1990s.
The …rst objective of this paper is therefore to investigate the causes of this
systematic predictive failure. I do so by pursuing two lines of enquiry. The
…rst is to re-examine the dynamic speci…cation of the Central Bank money
demand function, and the second is to re-visit the underlying structure of
money demand, paying particular attention to the role of net-wealth and the
speci…cation of the e¤ect of interest rates, in‡ation and the return on foreign
assets.
This stage in the investigation is carried out over the period up to mid
1998, during which time the economy enjoyed uninterrupted growth, holding
in reserve the period from 1998 to mid-2000. This latter period is used
to conduct out-of-sample forecast analysis and, as a result to revisit a full-
sample speci…cation.
1The Central Bank’s constitutional independence is enshrined in the Political Consti-
tution of Chile and codi…ed in the “Constitutional Organic Act of the Banco Central de
Chile” (October 1989). Under this charter, the Bank is charged with “pursuing the sta-
bility of the currency against the background of an orderly functioning of the payments
system”.
2Much of the recent debate evaluating the e¢cacy of stabilization policies in Chile
has been conducted within a VAR setting where the demand for money function (or
occasionally an in‡ation function) plays a central role (see Calvo and Mendoza, 1997,
Valdes, 1997, Schmidt-Hebbel, 1997, Corbo 1998).
2Four principal facts characterize the evolution of the Chilean macroecon-
omy in since the mid-1980s (Figure 1). The …rst is the fall in in‡ation. Since
the mid-1980s in‡ation has fallen consistently from a maximum of 30 percent
per annum to less than 4 percent per annum by mid-2000. Second, this has
occurred against a background of steady growth in real output and falling
unemployment. Growth averaged 7.3 percent per annum from 1985 until
mid-1998, making Chile one of the fastest growing economies in the world
over the period. This growth contrasts with an average of less than two
percent per annum in the 1980s but, more signi…cantly, the recent growth
performance has been extremely stable: the coe¢cient of variation for the
period being 0.37 compared to 15.4 for the decade preceding 1985. The re-
cession of 1998/99 saw output decline by around 3 percent year-on-year, but
by the …nal quarter of 1999 output returned to its earlier trend. Third, fol-
lowing a steady depreciation during the early 1980s, the real exchange rate
has appreciated at an average of just under 4 percent per annum since the
1989. Even allowing for underlying productivity growth relative to the US
(assumed by the authorities to be of the order of 2 percent per annum), and a
sharp depreciation towards the end of the period, this represents a signi…cant
cumulative real revaluation of the peso during the 1990s. Fourth, the real
exchange rate appreciation re‡ects, at least in part, a consistently tight do-
mestic monetary policy. The key domestic interest rate – the Tasa E¤ectiva
Politica (TEP)3 averaged over 6 percent per annum in real terms from 1985
to 1998 and rose as high as 13 percent per annum during the second half of
that year. As a consequence, indexed real lending rates (on medium-term
borrowing), for example, have averaged 9.4 percent per annum during the
decade and have never fallen below 7 percent.
Against this macroeconomic background of rapid growth and declining
in‡ation, the velocity of circulation for M1A has declined steadily, especially
since 1991(Figure 2).4 Plotted against developmentsin the domestic nominal
interest rate, shown in the lower panel, it appears thatprima facie evidence –
3Prior to 1987 intervention in money and bond markets occurred across a range of
indexed instruments of di¤erent maturities. From 1987 the Bank set the price for short-
dated (90 day) paper while selling longer dated securities on a tender basis. This continued
until April 1995 at which time the Bank focussed on the daily interbank interest rate,
in‡uencing its level through market operations (repos and reverse-repos). This rate is
referred to as the Tasa E¤ectiva Politica (TEP).
4The (quasi) velocity of circulation is de…ned as the ratio of the index of real economic
activity to the money stock. As discussed below, we use the the index of economic activity
excluding agriculture and copper. Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to
the M1A de…nition of money which consists of only non-interest bearing components of
money, namely currency in circulation plus current account deposit accounts plus other
sight deposits (all non-interest bearing).
3supported by the econometric analysis which follows – indicates that the fall
in M1A velocity in fact moves very closely in line with the decline in nominal
interest rates, at least until the second half of 1998. This suggests that, at
least in the long run, a simple model de…ned in terms of economic activity
(i.e. income) and nominal interests is likely to have relatively good explana-
tory power. What is particularly interesting, however, is that from around
late 1998 the velocity of circulation rises, even though the interest rate falls
sharply at this time. This rise in velocity, which indicates a counter-intuitive
shift away from money in the face of a falling opportunity costs, may re-
‡ect uncertainty about in‡ation within the region following the stabilization
crises in Brazil and elsewhere in the region following the collapse of the East
Asian economies in 1997. Whatever the cause, it is clear from Figure 2 that
this post-1998 behaviour of the velocity of circulation will pose an interest-
ing challenge to the econometric analysis. It is to the formalization of this
relationship I now turn.
Figure 1
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Figure 2: M1A and Central Bank Policy Rate
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42 Modelling the demand for money
A standard portfolio approach to the demand for money in an open economy
starts with a representative private agent with a four-asset portfolio consist-
ing of claims on government and the banking sector (represented by money),
real capital, and the rest of the world (see for example, McCallum and Good-
friend (1987) , Arrau et al (1995), McNellis(1998)). Money is assumed to
enter directly the utility function of the representative agent, re‡ecting cash-


















where c denotes real consumption, M denotes money (currency and non-
interest bearing deposits), M¤ is foreign money, suitably de…ned, E is the
nominal exchange rate, and P is the domestic price level. Equation (1) as-
sumes that utility is separable in consumption and money and that domestic
and foreign money are substitutes in providing liquidity services to the agent.
Assuming for simplicity that the representative agent holds no foreign bonds
and interest is paid in arrears on opening asset stocks, the inter-temporal
budget constraint is de…ned as
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where y ¡ ¿ denotes real disposable income, b real bonds which earn a real
return r, and D are interest-bearing deposits earning a nominal return id. A












Maximizing (1) by choosing end-of-period portfolio allocations subject to (2)











where y¤ denotes real disposable income (gross of net interest income), ib
denotes the nominal return on bonds, ¼ denotes in‡ation and e the depreci-
ation of the exchange rate. Importantly, underpinning (4) is the view that
current asset demands are conditioned on expected income, wealth, and asset
5prices. Thus the regressors are potentially endogenous. These issues can be
handled in a number of ways: in this paper I adopt an approach developed
by Johansen (1992) in which the conditional demand functions are derived
as restrictions on a generalized vector error correction model.
2.1 Speci…cation and estimation
Equation (4) represents the most common form of conditional demand func-
tion, although the literature embraces a wide range of approaches to the
estimation of the parameters of this function. One tradition, for example,
derives this portfolio choice from an explicit demand system in which asset
shares (including money) are de…ned in terms of wealth and income and rel-
ative asset prices.5 It is more common to estimate the parameters from
conditional asset-by-asset demand functions where asset returns are typi-
cally speci…ed in nominal terms. Researchers in this tradition have tended
to adopt relatively simple speci…cations based on a linear approximation of
(4), which is the strategy adopted here, although this approach is not univer-
sal. Easterly et al (1995) adopt a non-linear least-squares estimator to allow
explicitly for variable in‡ation semi-elasticities for high-in‡ation economies,
while McNellis (1998) uses arti…cial neural network methods to allow for
unobservable non-linearity in the long-run demand for money function.
In the current context, two speci…cation issues are of particular inter-
est. The …rst is the role of real …nancial wealth. Relatively few studies
of the demand for money include wealth as a regressor, mainly because of
data limitations. However in those instances where reliable data do exist,
researchers have found net wealth to play an important role. In the UK,
for example, a number of papers have identi…ed wealth e¤ects in money de-
mand functions (for example, Grice and Bennett (1985), Adam (1991), and
Thomas (1997) on broad money aggregates, and Jansen (1998) for narrow
money). In these models the wealth e¤ect captures two o¤setting processes.
The …rst is a classical income e¤ect arising from the non-neutrality of real
…nancial wealth: assuming money is a normal good this e¤ect is expected to
raise money demand, ceteris paribus. This may be o¤set by a second e¤ect
where rising wealth typically allows for greater portfolio diversi…cation (par-
ticularly if there are non-convex adjustment costs) away from non-interest
bearing money. The net e¤ect of rising wealth on the demand for money
is therefore strictly ambiguous although the empirical work for the UK and
elsewhere typically …nds positive but low e¤ects on money demand.
5This approach has been popularized by Barr and Cuthbertson (1991), and allows for
direct testing of fundamental axions of demand such as, for example, that asset demands
are homogeneous of degree zero in prices.
6The second issue concerns the speci…cation of asset returns. Here the
literature is replete with alternative speci…cations, re‡ecting di¤erent insti-
tutional constraints on portfolio choices. At one extreme, in the case of low-
income open economies where …nancial intermediation is limited, or where
…nancial repression …xes domestic interest rates, the standard measure of
the return to holding money is (negative) the rate of in‡ation (Easterly et al,
1995), orthe rate of nominal depreciation of the (o¢cial or parallel) exchange
rate (Domowitz and Elbadawi, 1986). In economies characterized by moder-
ate in‡ation rates and more developed domestic …nancial sectors, researchers
tend to examine a broader vector of asset returns including the return on in-
terestbearing money (as proxied by the depositrate of interest),the return on
alternativedomesticassets (such as bonds), oron foreign-denominated assets.
In addition various measures of price volatility (typically backward-looking
standard deviation measures) are included to re‡ect the risk aversion implicit
in speculative or portfolio allocation models. Thus, for example, Hendry and
Ericsson’s (1991) study of money demand in the UK and US include short-
and long-term interest rates as well as a measure of in‡ation (in their case a
GNP de‡ator); Johansen (1995) excludes in‡ation but includes two interest
rates (a representative deposit rate of interest and the bond rate); Jensen’s
(1998) model for UK base money prefers a speci…cation which includes the
short-run interest rate, in‡ation and in‡ation variability. Closer to home,
Ahumada’s (1992) study of Argentina considered in‡ation and a single inter-
est rate, Arrau et al (1995) use the rate of interest on short term deposits,
while the body of VAR-based work carried out within the Central Bank of
Chile, rather naturally given the empirical methodology, concentrated on in-
‡ation and the short-term policy rate as discussed above (see Valdes, 1997
and Herrera and Caputo, 1998).
The work reported below summarizes an extensive evaluation of alterna-
tive asset market speci…cations. As I show below, the data accepts a number
of rival speci…cations which re‡ect the relative stability of relationship be-
tween asset prices. It is not my intention here to examine the term structure
within Chilean asset markets, but rather I focus on the key asset market
information used by the private sector in determining its demand for money.
Since my focus in this paper is the demand for transactions balances only
(M1A), which is entirely non-interest bearing, the ex post opportunity cost
to holding M1A should in principle be the (weighted) return to the portfo-
lio of other assets (real assets, central bank paper, foreign-currency deposits
or, more reasonably, interest bearing deposits with the banking sector). The
closest substitute to non-interest bearing bank deposits are less-liquid but in-
terest bearing deposits with the banking sector suggesting that for M1A the
appropriate interest rate would be the return on short-term deposits with the
7banking sector, which is the rate used in the Central Bank’s money demand
studies. However, under the in‡ation-targeting regime the key interest rate is
the policy rate or TEP which is an indexed rate denominated in terms of the
indexation unit of account, the unidad de fomento (UF).6 In the empirical
work reported below I convert the TEP to an ex post nominal interest rate
(the real policy rate adjusted for actual in‡ation ), but also examine whether
there is a di¤erential response to the ‘policy’ and in‡ation components of the
nominal interest rate.
3 Empirical Analysis
The natural starting point for my empirical investigation is the Central
Bank’s existing model for the demand for money which adopts a traditional
partial-adjustment speci…cation of the following form:7
(m¡ p)t = ®0 + ®1yt + ®2it + ®3ªt + ®4(m¡ p)t¡1 + "t (5)
where (m¡ p) denotes the log of real money balances, M1A; de‡ated by
the consumer price index; yt is a proxy for real income de…ned by the log of
the Central Bank’s monthly indicator of economic activity (IMAE); i is
the domestic interest rate on short-term domestic deposits; and ª denotes a
vector of monthly seasonal dummy variables, a dummy variable capturing
national holidays, and a single-period dummy variable capturing a large
impulse to reserve money (and thus M1A ) in March-April 1992.8 Using
monthly data for the period February 1985 to May 1998 (t-statistics are
reported in parentheses) the Central Bank’s basic model is:
(m ¡p)t = 1:945+ 0:314yt ¡ 0:034it + 0:726(m¡ p)t¡1 (6)
[10:93] [8:69] [13:41] [26:33]
T = 160 ¹ R2 = 0:998 s:d(m¡ p) = 0:363 ¾ = 0:017
DW = 1:751
Forecast Â2 : Â2(25) = 98:184 [0:0000]¤¤
Forecast Chow-test : F(25;132) = 2:386 [0:0008]¤¤
6The UF index is equal to the previous month’s consumer price in‡ation so that the
policy rate is (to a close approximation) equal to the ex post real interest rate.The equiv-
alence is only approximate because collection lags means that the UF ‘month’ does not
exactly coincide with the calendar month.
7This model was operational as of April 1999. I am grateful to Rodrigo Caputo of the
Macroeconomic Division for providing details on this speci…cation.
8Base money increased by 72 percent between February and May 1992 but returned to
its original level in May 1992.
8Solving out, this generates an implied long run or equilibrium demand
function of the form
(m ¡p)t = 7:09+ 1:145yt ¡ 0:124it: (7)
The model tracks past behaviour of real money balances extremely well but,
as the Forecast Â2 and break-point Chow test statistics reported under equa-
tion (6) indicate, the out-of-sample forecast performance of the model over
the period from the mid-1998 to mid-2000 is poor. It appears that although
the model successfully forecasts the decline in real money demand during the
second half of 1998, it systematically (and statistically signi…cantly) over-
predicts demand for money during the recovery in 1999 and the decline in
the …rst half of 2000: every single forecast error (m ¡ ^ m) is negative (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3: Central Bank Money Demand 25 month forecast
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3.1 Re-speci…cation of the Central Bank model
It should also be noted that the point estimate implied greater than unity
long run income elasticity in (7) is higher than theory would suggest. One
possible explanation is that this re‡ects the trend decline in the velocity of
circulation, but it is also possible that it is due to the well known biases in
long-run parameter estimates that arise using partial-adjustment speci…ca-
tionsin the presence ofnon-stationary data. My empirical approach therefore
commences with an analysis of the dynamic speci…cation of the above model
before proceeding to review issues more general issues in the speci…cation of
the model. As noted above, I shall conduct this analysis over the period from
1986 to 1998 only, leaving the most recent history for out-of-sample analysis.
93.1.1 Time-series characteristics of the data
The …rststep istoexamine the time-series characteristics of the data. In view
of the well-known low power of these tests, I subject the data to a battery
of alternative tests. The data and tests are reported in Appendix I and can
be arranged in three groups. The …rst set derive from the original Dickey-
Fuller tests and are de…ned against the null hypothesis that a time-series has
a unit root under di¤erent (un-tested) assumptions concerning deterministic
components in the data: these are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron t-tests. The second set of tests reverses the null hypothesis to test the
null of stationarity against the alternative of non-stationarity (Kwiatkowski,
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin - KPSS). The third group focuses on testing
joint hypotheses about the stochastic and deterministic components of the
time-series (Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron F-tests).
Taken together these unit root tests paint an interesting, if slightly con-
fusing, picture. The fundamental issue is not whether the macroeconomic
time series on money aggregates, income, and wealth proxies exhibit trend-
ing behaviour over time, since they clearly do, but whether this trend is best
characterized as stochastic or deterministic. To illustrate the problem, con-
sider the data on the log of the real money stock (LRM1A). Allowing only
for a drift in the process then the tests suggest that real money is clearly
non-stationary: the null that the series has a unit root cannot be rejected for
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests in columns 1 and 3 of
Appendix Table 2, while the null of stationarity is decisively rejected under
the KPSS test with drift in column 5. However, from another perspective the
data are also fully consistent with a trend-stationary representation (the null
is rejected for the PP test with trend (column 4) and is just accepted for the
KPSS test with trend (column 6)). Following the reduction sequence sug-
gested by Dolado, Jenkinson and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990), reported in column
7, con…rms in this case that a deterministic trend-stationary representation
is marginally more likely than a stochastic trend one.9 A similar analysis for
the indicators of economic activity (LIMAE and LIMAEX), and real net
…nancial wealth (LRNW) reveals a similar degree of ambiguity: while the
balance of evidence is marginally in favour of a stochastic trend (i.e. unit
root) representation for the measure of wealth, the two measures of economic
activity appear to contain a deterministic trend.
An immediate problem is how one should interpret these results, bearing
in mind the relatively low power of this class of test. Should the obvious
9This reduction sequence uses both F- and t-tests to test for unit roots under progres-
sively restrictive assumption concerning the deterministic components of a time-series.
This routine is automated under the RATS source code urauto.src.
10trend in the data be treated as deterministic (a linear trend) or stochastic
(a unit root)? There are strong reasons for favouring the latter. From a the-
oretical perspective, the assumption that the long-run evolution of the data
is deterministic – so that shocks impact only the deviation around the trend
and not the trend itself – seems unreasonably restrictive. Moreover, while a
trend-stationary description may adequately describe well the current, rela-
tively short, sample, it needs to be recognized that this period is unusual.
Viewed over a longer historical time-span, Chile has seen large permanent
movements in the level of real variables consistent with a unit-root process.
It is therefore unreasonable to assume that money and income in Chile can
be characterized over any forecast horizon beyond the short-run as station-
ary around a deterministic linear trend. In the light of these reservations, I
therefore proceed under the assumption that the trends in these time-series
are stochastic rather than deterministic so that the series can be character-
ized as random walks with drift. As shall be seen in the next section, this
has important implication for the interpretation of the long-run cointegrating
characteristics of the data.
Matters are somewhat clearer with the price level (CPI89), the exchange
rate (NER), and the various interest rates. Prices and the nominal exchange
rate are I(1) with drift so that (monthly) in‡ation and the depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate are I(0), while the real (annual) and nominal
(monthly) interest rates are borderline non-stationary.
3.1.2 Cointegration analysis
Even though the data appear to be a mixture of trend and di¤erence station-
ary processes, I start by assuming that the vector of variables in (5), denoted
Xt = f(m ¡ p)t;yt;itg; consist of at least some non-stationary components.
I proceed to a cointegration analysis following a standard Johansen analysis,
starting with an analysis of the Central Bank model before extending the
discussion to consider alternative speci…cations of the basic model.
The general vector error-correction model (VECM) which provides the





¡i¢Xt¡i + ©t + ªt + "t (8)
where ¯
0 denotes the parameters of the cointegrating vectors (if such relation-
ships exist), and ® denotes the matrix of feedback, or error-correction, e¤ects
of the dynamic equations in ¢Xt to the long-run relationships. ¡i represents
11the vector of short-term parameters, and the vector ªt consists of seasonal
dummy variables. This representation thus describes the evolution of the
variables X as being driven partly by the cointegrating or long-run equilib-
rium relations between the variables (assuming they exists), and partly by
the evolution of the so-called “common trends” component, ¢Xt¡i:10 At this
stage a key decision concerns how to characterize the deterministic compo-
nents of the model, ©t; particularly in the light of the slightly ambiguous
evidence from the unit root tests. The deterministic components consist of a
constant, ¹, and a linear trend t. In principle, either or both components can
enter the cointegrating and the common-trends components of the model. To













¡i¢Xt¡i + ®?¹2 + ®?±2t + ªt + "t(9)
"t v niid(0;§)
The parameters ®¹1 and ®±1 measure the e¤ect of the deterministic compo-
nents on the long-run properties of the model, while ®?¹2 and ®?±2 measure
the e¤ect on the common-trends, or growth-rate, components.
Five alternative speci…cations for the deterministic components of the
model are embedded in (9), depending on the values of ¹i and ±i.11 These
are: (i) ¹i and ±i (where i = 1;2) are unrestricted so that there may be
linear trends in the growth rate of Xt (i.e. ±2 6= 0 ) which implies that there
are quadratic trends in the levels of the vector Xt ; (ii) ±2 = 0 which excludes
quadratic trends in the levels relationship but allows for the possibility of
a deterministic linear trend in the cointegrating vector(s); (iii) ±1 = ±2 = 0
which implies no linear trend in the cointegrating relationships but allows
for linear trends in the level of the data itself (through ¹2 6= 0 operating on
¢Xt), and non-zero intercepts in the cointegration vector; (iv) ±1 = ±2 = 0
and ¹2 = 0 which implies that the only deterministic components in the data
are the intercepts in the cointegrating relationship; and (v) ¹1 = ¹2 = ±1 =
±2 = 0 which assumes no deterministic components in the model.
I distinguish between these rival speci…cations (allowing for alternative
speci…cations of the income and interest rate) by comparing the trace statis-
tic under each restriction.12 At this stage I also consider two other speci…ca-
10See Johansen (1995, chapter 3).
11See Hansen and Juselius (1995).
12The Trace statistic is de…ned ¡T
P
ln(1 ¡ ^ ¸i) where ¸i are the eigenvalues of maxi-
mization problem underlying the estimation of the vector ®¯
0(4). We assume a lag-length
of 6 throughout.
12tion issues. First, I examine the properties of two alternative versions of the
income variable, yt. The basic measure, the monthly index of economic activ-
ity (denoted LIMAE) is currently employed by the Bank’s Macroeconomic
Division. I also consider an alternative index, (denoted here as LIMAEX),
which is the same index excluding the agriculture and copper mining sec-
tors, the two sectors subject to greater short-run price volatility in world
prices, independent of domestic economic factors. Second, I consider both
a logarithmic and semi-log speci…cation for the nominal policy interest rate
(money and income measures are both de…ned in logs). The summary trace
statistics for the alternative speci…cations are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Trace Statistic for Alternative Speci…cations of Deterministic
Components in the VECM
Sample:1986(1)-99(1) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Scale Variable Interest Rate ±i 6= 0 ±2 = 0 ±i = 0 ±i = 0 ±i = 0
¹i 6= 0 ¹i;±1 6= 0 ¹i 6= 0 ¹2 = 0 ¹i = 0
LIMAE log 57.129 59.013 43.144 57.854 36.701
LIMAEX log 56.973 58.927 49.186 61.984 51.738
LIMAE semi-log 53.721 55.132 38.114 54.522 36.026
LIMAEX semi-log 52.106 53.617 43.028 55.883 51.889
The trace statistics indicate that the most likely speci…cation for the
deterministic components in the model is either Model 4, where the only de-
terministic component is the constant of cointegration, or Model 2, where the
cointegrating vector itself contains a deterministic trend. Given the evidence
from Appendix Table 2 on the unit root properties of the data, it follows
naturally that the trend-stationary representation under Model 2 will ex-
plain the data well, at least within our sample period. However, for the
reasons discussed above, the alternative given by Model 4 is a more appeal-
ing speci…cation. Adopting this latter characterization, the results suggest
that the dominant speci…cation is in terms of the narrower de…nition of the
scale variable, and a logarithmic speci…cation of the interest rate.
The Cointegrating Rank To determine and evaluate the cointegrating
vectors I next estimate the restricted VECM, equation (10), where k = 6 is









¡i¢Xt¡i + ªt + "t (10)
"t v niid(0;§):
13Table 2 reports the residual diagnostics of model (10) and Table 3 the eigen-
values and associated statistics for the cointegrating vectors. The residual
diagnostics suggest that there is no serious misspeci…cation, either for the
vector Xt as a whole, or the components, except in terms of the violation
of the Jarque-Bera test for error normality which re‡ects outlier observa-
tions due to the jump in reserve money discussed in the context of equation
(5) above. Conditioning the cointegration analysis on a dummy variable for
this event eliminates the skewness / kurtosis causing the violation of error
normality.
Table 2: VECM Residual diagnostic statistics
AR(1) LB(12) ARCH(7) H JB
X 1.209 75.947 0.677 80.227**
m 0.861 3.932 0.081 52.347**
y 0.842 21.337 0.137 5.038
i 1.156 6.498 0.424 8.512
Notes: AR(1) denotes LM test for vector (series) …rst-order autocorrelation
LB(12) is Ljung-Box Portmanteau test against residual autocorrelation; ARCH
is Engle’s test against conditional heteroscedasticity; H is White’s vector test
for heteroscedasticity, and JB is Jarque-Bera test for vector (series) normality.
All tests distributed Â2; ** denotes signi…cant at 1% level, * signi…cant at 5%.
Table 3 Eigenvalues (¸r), Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Statistics
Maximal Eigenvalue Trace Statistic
r ¸r ¡(T ¡ nm)ln(1¡ ¸r) 5%c:v: ¡(T ¡ nm)
P
ln(1¡ ¸r) 5%c:v
0 0.4922 87.42** 22.0 110.00** 34.9
1 0.1499 20.95** 15.7 22.58** 20.0
2 0.0125 1.63 9.2 1.63 9.2
Statistics reported with Reimers (1992) small-sample correction. Critical Values
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Table 3 suggests that the cointegrating rank in this case is two, although
the second eigenvalue is only one-third the size of the largest, and is only just
signi…cant. The two signi…cant ¯
0 eigenvectors and ® feedback vectors are
reported in Table 4. As is well known, cointegrating vectors are only unique
in terms of the space they span (i.e. the …rst and second rows of the ¯
0 matrix
are unique stationary linear combinations of the variables) so that the nor-
malization chosen in Table 4 is arbitrary: it does not necessarily follow that
the …rst cointegrating vector represents the demand for money. However, in
this case interpreting it as such has a prima facie plausibility. It suggests an
14income elasticity of the demand for money of just under unity and an elastic-
ity with respect to the monthly interest rate of -0.189, which seem plausible,
both in terms of theory and relative to the existing partial-adjustment based
model, equation (7). The second piece of evidence in support of this inter-
pretation is the that the feedback coe¢cient on the …rst vector is negative,
strongly signi…cant, and quite high, indicating a mean lag response to mon-
etary shocks of around 4 months.13 The …rst vector is therefore, plausibly,
our money demand function, where c denotes the restricted constant, ®±1.
Table 4
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m¡ p y i c
(1) 1.000 -0.931 0.218 -0.670
(2) -0.891 1.000 -0.006 -0.215
® Loadings (Adjustment/Feedback) Vectors
standard errors in parenthesis
(1) (2)
¢(m¡ p) -0.178 0.196
¢y -0.013 -0.187
¢i 0.442 -2.673
There is, however, the second vector to consider. Although it too could
represent a money demand function this seems unlikely. The vector suggests
a positive relationship between money and income but that this is not in-
‡uenced by the interest rate (the coe¢cient on i is low at ¡0:006 and not
statistically signi…cant). This relationship, which traces the trend decline in
velocity as seen in Figure 2, would appear to re‡ect the evidence from Table
A1 on the unit root statistics. There I noted that both real money balances
and real economic activity were borderline trend-stationary processes. If the
underlying deterministic trend in these processes is similar (as it is in this in-
stance) then such a pair of series would naturally generate a stationary linear
combination and hence would lead to a second signi…cant eigenvalue statistic
in Table 3, even though it may not represent an economically meaningful
cointegrating relationship.14
13The mean lag is de…ned as ¹ = (1 ¡ ®)=®
14Each (trend) stationary variable in the vector X necessarily creates an additional
stationary combination: this can be tested by considering whether the stationary com-
bination remains signi…cant in the face of restriction of the non-stationary variables out
of the vector. This is what I do with the identi…cation restrictions here. Notice that
this interpretation, namely that the second cointegrating vector is a product of the short-
15Given that the focus in this paper is the money demand function my
strategy is to seek a set of restrictions which allow me to derive a unique
identi…cation of the …rst vector as a money demand relationship in a manner
that ensures that the second vector is appropriately handled (even though
it does not necessarily lend itself to a meaningful economic interpretation).
For a cointegrating rank r = 2 identi…cation can be achieved by imposing (at
least) one restriction per vector. A natural restriction suggested by Table 5
is to impose a unit income elasticity on the money demand function (vector
1) and to restrict the second vector to be de…ned in terms the money-income
relationship only. This implies that the cointegrating space can be de…ned
by the two identi…ed vectors:-
¯
¤




(where a * denotes an unrestricted coe¢cient). The validity of the restriction
is tested with the standard likelihood ratio test which is distributed Â2 with Pr
i=1(p¡ si ¡r + 1) degrees of freedom, where p is the dimension of X, r is
the cointegrating rank, and (p¡si) is the number of restrictions imposed on
each cointegrating vector.15 In the above case I …nd
LR(r = 2) : Â
2(1) = 1:4524[0:2281]
which indicates that the restriction can comfortably be accepted, allowing
a unique long-run cointegrating relationship underpinning the demand for
money to be identi…ed.
However, as Johansen (1992) shows, it is only valid to move from this re-
sult direct to a single-equation representation of the demand function (in the
presence of single or multiple cointegrating vectors) if the following “partial
system” restriction is also accepted by the data (conditional on the restric-








This restriction implies that the cointegrating vectors feedback onto the
¢(m¡p)t equation only, allowing us to ignore, without loss of likelihood, the
dynamic equations for ¢yt and ¢it. Failing to accept this restriction implies
sample characteristics of the data, is consistent with …ndings from other research on Chile
using longer time-periods which typically …nd only a single cointegrating vector for money
demand models of this form.
15(see Johansen, 1995, Theorem 7.5)
16that ¢yt and ¢it cannot be treated as weakly exogenous with respect to the
parameters of a single-equation error correction model for ¢(m¡ p)t.
In this case of Chile the restriction is rejected at standard probability
levels, but the weaker restriction
®
0




is accepted (in thiscase LR(r = 2) : Â2(4) = 7:7084[0:1029]).Thisrestriction,
which is imposed jointly with the restrictions on the ¯
0 matrix, implies the
following restricted cointegrating vectors and feedback matrix (with asymp-
totic standard errors reported beneath un-restricted coe¢cient estimates).
Table 5
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m¡ p y i c
(1) 1.000 -1.000 0.1185 -0.3571
[0.0189] [0.084]
(2) -0.912 1.000 0.000 0.000
[0.006]
® Loadings (Adjustment/Feedback) Vectors
(1) (2)






This restriction is quite interesting. It suggests that I can accept that the
money demand cointegrating vector impacts only on the dynamic model for
money, ¢(m¡ p)t, and that the second vector only impacts on the ¢y and
¢i processes. However, because the second vector is de…ned in terms of the
level of real money balances, it follows that I must allow for the possibility
that both income and the short-run interest rate are potentially endogenous
regressors in the dynamic money demand model which will, therefore, require
to be estimated using an IV estimator.16
16This arises because the second cointegrating vector is de…ned in terms of money and
income and feeds back on to both income and the interest rate implying a contemporaneous
link from these two variables to money.
173.2 Alternative speci…cations
At this stage it would be natural to proceed directly to the dynamic error-
correction model based on the evidence from Table 5.17 However, it is useful
to …rst return to our general theoretical model (4) to consider whether a
more general model, which includes wealth e¤ects and a more comprehensive
treatment of asset prices, better …ts the data. This kind of speci…cation
search is potentially extensive: in order to keep the paper brief I shall report
only the main …ndings of this speci…cation search.
3.2.1 Returns on other assets
I consider three alternative speci…cations of the vector of opportunity cost
variables. First, I consider the consequence of adding a measure of the rate of
interest on deposits. Second I examine the e¤ect of decomposing the nominal
interest rate into its in‡ation and real interest rate components. Finally, I
consider the role of currency substitution e¤ects by including the (ex post)
rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. To summarize the …ndings,
it appears that a model de…ned exclusively in terms of the short-run nominal
policy rate of interest is the most e¢cient speci…cation for the transactions
demand for money over this period. Neither adding additional interest rates,
nor decomposing the nominal rate into its real interest rate and in‡ation
components, nor allowing for exchange rate e¤ects improves the statistical
power of the model, suggesting that for the transactions demand for money,
the nominal policy rate of interest is a su¢cient statistic for the opportunity
cost of money. This is not a particularly surprising …nding and is echoed in
much of the empirical literature on the transactions demand for money.18
The detail of this investigation are summarized in Appendix II so here
I limit myself to the details of the investigation strategy and main results.
I …rst consider the own rate of interest. In the previous speci…cation the
only opportunity cost variable was the ex post nominal policy rate (i.e. the
e¤ective nominal rate derived from the real e¤ective policy rate and the in‡a-
tion rate), based on the assumption that all of M1A is non-interest bearing.
However, if current accounts attract interest (as is becoming common), or if
current accounts are complementary with interest-bearing savings accounts,
it may be appropriate to allow for both the policy rate (which measures the
cost of holding money for transactions purposes) and the “own-rate” of inter-
17Details are available on request from the author but it is possible to show that the
error-correction representation readily outperforms the Central Bank speci…cation.
18McNelis (1998), for example, …nds that only the domestic interest rate is signi…cant
in the long-run demand for money estimated over the period from 1983 to 1994.






t id the policy rate of interest and id
t is the
deposit rate of interest. Estimating this version of the model generates three
signi…cant eigenvectors, reported in Table 6
Table 6
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m¡ p y ip id cnst
(1) 1.000 -0.953 0.235 -0.067 -0.709
(2) -0.882 1.000 -0.022 0.022 -0.250
(3) -3.839 3.922 1.000 -1.926 -2.287
Allowing for the own interest rate e¤ect does not signi…cantly alter the
measured income elasticity or the constant of the vector. However, the co-
e¢cient on the policy rate has increased (and is still negative) while that
on the own rate has the opposite sign. This indicates that an increase in
the deposit rate of interest in the long-run, ceteris paribus, increases money
demand although with a weaker e¤ect than a corresponding negative e¤ect
of an increase in the policy rate. Although the second vector also retains the
same structure as before it also hints at a symmetry between the two interest
rates, consistent with the stationarity of the spread between the two interest
rates. As shown in Appendix II, this symmetry can be used to eliminate id
in the …rst vector, in which case the money demand relationship reduces to
exactly the parameterization found in Table 5 above (where the net inter-
est elasticity = -0.113). From a purely statistical perspective at least, the
cointegration between nominal interest rates thus allows us to represent the
long-run money demand function solely in terms of the policy rate in the
knowledge that other rates are cointegrated with the policy rate. In other
words there is no signi…cant loss of information in de…ning the (long-run)
money demand function as a function only of the short-rate.
3.2.2 Di¤erential response to in‡ation and the real policy rate
Next I consider the role of in‡ation. Implicit in the original speci…cation is
the assumption that agents respond equivalently at the margin to changes
in the opportunity cost of holding money, regardless of whether the change
in the cost arises from the e¤ect of in‡ation or from a change in the interest
rate. To test this hypothesis I use the same basic model but decompose the
19This is the speci…cation examined for Denmark by Johansen and Juselius, 1990).
19nominal interest rate into a pure in‡ation e¤ect and the pure interest rate
e¤ect (ignoring the joint e¤ect r¼ which is negligible in monthly data)
i = r + ¼ + r¼ ¼ r + ¼ (14)
and test whether the coe¢cient restriction ¯
r = ¯
¼ is accepted in the money
demand relationship. As the tables in Appendix II show, the restriction is
comfortably accepted by the data and reveals that the restricted interest
/ in‡ation elasticity is of the same order of magnitude as in our previous
case (-0.145 compared to -0.114 ). This implies that a model de…ning the
transactions demand for money solely in terms of the nominal policy rate of
interest provides an e¢cient and data-consistent representation of the (long-
run) data
3.2.3 Currency substitution
Finally currency substitution is tested by including the depreciation of the
nominal peso exchange rate relative to the US dollar in the vector X.20 Since
thisvariable is strongly stationary, this will generate an additional cointegrat-
ing vector. However, even allowing for this e¤ect there is some weak evidence
of currency substitution in money demand (a rise in the exchange-rate ad-
justed foreign interest rate reduced domestic money demand), although the
e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant and the coe¢cient can be restricted to
zero, suggesting that in the interests of parsimony I am justi…ed in reverting
to the basic speci…cation used above (10).
3.3 Wealth e¤ects
Finally, I turn to the role of wealth in the money demand function. Ideally
I would use a measure of the total net wealth of the private sector (i.e.
including their claims on real assets including housing and foreign assets).
These data are not, however, readily available and I therefore follow common
practice elsewhere and use a measure of real net …nancial wealth (see Jansen,
1998), de…ned as the total …nancial claims of the non-bank private sector
against the banking sector, government and the rest of the world, net of
their liabilities to those sectors (i.e. the net claims of the monetary sector
on the non-bank private sector), all de‡ated by the price index. For Chile
wealth is de…ned as
20This speci…cation assumes that currency substitution is a purely transactions activity
and that foreign currency deposits are un-remunerated. However allowing for the possiblity
that foreign assets are interesting bearing by de…ning the relevant opportunity cost as the
exchange rate adjusted interest di¤erential does not alter the …ndings reported here.
20wt =
(M4+ FXD ¡ NCRED)
P
(15)
where M4 equals currency plus demand, sight and time deposits, plus private
sectorholdings of bonds and bills; FXD equals “on-shore”holdingsof foreign
currency (valued in current pesos), and NCRED is the net credit from the
monetary system to the non-bank private sector.
Figure 4 Log Real Net Wealth (Constant 1989 Prices)







Log Real Net Wealth
AsFigure 4indicates, on this measure there has been asigni…cant increase
in real net wealth over the period from 1985-1991(averaging around 15% -
25% per annum) but a leveling out during the 1990s, and indeed stagnating
later in the decade. Table 7 reports the eigenvalues and signi…cant cointe-
grating vectors (plus their feedback coe¢cients) for the model represented
by (10) but where X is augmented by real net …nancial wealth.
Table 7 Eigenvalues, Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Statistics
Maximal Eigenvalue Trace Statistic
r ¸r ¡(T ¡ nm)ln(1¡ ¸r) 5%c.v. ¡(T ¡ nm)
P
ln(1¡ ¸r) 5%c.v
0 0.5386 113.70** 28.1 159.90** 53.10
1 0.1761 28.47** 22.0 46.25** 34.90
2 0.0953 14.72 15.7 17.78 20.0
3 0.0206 3.06 9.2 3.06 9.2
Statistics reported with Reimers (1992) small sample correction. Critical Values
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m ¡ p y w ip c
(1) 1.000 -0.434 -0.362 0.245 0.762
(2) -0.766 1.000 -0.108 0.086 0.287
21® Loadings (Adjustment/Feedback) Vectors
(1) (2)




Including wealth in the demand function has a signi…cant e¤ect on the
measured transactions demand for money, lowering it to approximately 0.4.
The wealth elasticity is positive and signi…cant (the asymptotic standard
error is approximately 0.094), but lower than the income elasticity. The
elasticity with respect to the policy interest rate remains negative and sig-
ni…cant although is signi…cantly larger than in the baseline case. As above, I
seek identifying restrictions on this two-vector system to isolate the wealth-
augmented demand function. To do so I restrict the income elasticity to 0.5
and restrict both wealth and the interest rate from the second vector (to
allow it the same interpretation as before). I have also imposed the same
“partial system” restriction as before on the feedback vector. This gives the
following restricted cointegrating vectors where I have included the asymp-
totic standard error for the ¯
0 vectors and their feedback coe¢cients.
Table 8
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m ¡ p y w ip c
(1) 1.000 -0.500 -0.331 0.248 0.610
[0.032] [0.042] [0.298]
(2) -0.909 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.008]
® Loadings (Adjustment/Feedback) Vectors
(1) (2)








LR Test against restriction (r=2) Â2(6) = 10:137 [0.0715].
22The LRtestindicatesthatI can acceptthesamepartial-systemrestriction
on the vector error correction model as before. Hence I can de…ne the error
correction model in terms of the …rst row of Table 8 but where ¢y, ¢w, and
¢ip may be endogenousin the dynamic speci…cation forthe reasons discussed
above. Given this, I next proceed to a single-equation error correction model.
3.4 A single equation error-correction model
I de…ne the deviation from equilibrium money demand directly from the …rst
eigenvector in Table 8 (controlling also for seasonal dummy variables) as
¸t = (m¡ 0:5y ¡ 0:331w + 0:248i
p + 0:610): (16)
Since the dynamic model for ¢(m ¡ p)t does not adjust to deviations from
the second eigenvector, thegeneral over-parameterized errorcorrection model
can be de…ned as:
A(L)¢(m¡ p)t = B(L)¢yt + C(L)¢it + D(L)¢wt (17)
+E(L)¾¼t + °^ ¸t¡1 + ªt + "t
where ¢ denotes the monthly di¤erence operator, A(L), B(L), C(L); D(L)
and E(L) are lagpolynomial parametermatrices, and ° istheerror-correction
coe¢cient. The vector ªt denotes the deterministic components as discussed
above (monthly dummy variables, a dummy variable controlling for the pat-
tern of public holidays (denoted DHOL); and DM0292; an impulse dummy
variable taking the value of one in March 1992. Equation (17) also includes
a measure of in‡ation volatility denoted ¾¼, measured as the change in the
12-month moving standard deviation of the monthly in‡ation rate.21
Table 9 reports three versions of the model. In the …rst, I estimate the
model using OLS and then, given the results from the long-run cointegration
analysis, I re-estimate the model instrumenting for ¢yt, ¢wt and ¢i
p
t. I
also consider a version of the OLS model in which I allow for an asymmetric
error-correction mechanism (so that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium
di¤ers between positive and negative disequilibria).
21An alternative measure of volatility, de…ned as a moving standard deviation of the





(^ ¸t¡i ¡ ¹ ¸)2:
Both measures are virtually identical, implying that measured deviation from the long-run
equilibrium re‡ects price rather than income shocks. We therefore only report the version
with the traditional in‡ation volatility measure.
23Table 9. Dynamic Error Correction Money Demand Model
Dependent Variable ¢(m¡ p)t. Sample 1986(7) - 1998(8)
Model [1] OLS [2] OLS [3] IV
Variable Coe¤. HCSE-t Coe¤. HCSE-t Coe¤. t-value Instab
Constant 0.037 7.71 0.032 2.76 0.037 5.519 0.10
¢(m¡ p)t¡2 -0.274 5.17 -0.264 5.08 -0.270 5.946 0.15
¢(m¡ p)t¡3 -0.160 3.55 -0.183 4.13 -0.153 2.868 0.99*
¢yt 0.353 1.55 0.393 1.75 0.382{ 1.147 0.04
¢wt 0.333 4.31 0.317 4.32 0.341{ 2.863 0.74*
¢wt¡2 0.242 3.50 0.215 3.22 0.241 3.213 0.32
¢i
p
t -0.058 10.27 -0.058 10.18 -0.063{ 10.294 0.15
¢i
p
t¡3 -0.015 2.83 -0.017 3.31 -0.015 2.868 0.03
^ ¸t¡1 -0.124 11.63 - - -0.129 11.783 0.06
^ ¸
+
t¡1 - - -0.103 5.48 - -
^ ¸
¡
t¡1 - - -0.139 6.44 - -
¾¼t -0.359 2.87 -0.372 3.05 -0.318 2.281 0.24
DM0292 0.138 15.86 0.138 16.26 0.138 14.345 0.09
Dhol 0.004 2.67 0.004 3.36 0.004 2.879 0.09
R2 0.935 R2 0.943 s.e (SF) 0.0138
s.e 0.0138 s.e 0.0135 s.e (RF) 0.0167
s.d 0.0488
DW 1.96 DW 1.96
Lv 0.239 LR:Â2(1) 1.695 Sp:(17) 9.824
Lf 6.114* [0.1292] [0.9108]
AR(6) 1.14 [0.343] DM:(21) 1767.8
ARCH(6) 1.21 [0.310] [0.000]
White-H 0.81 [0.738]
J-B 0.37 [0.832]
Notes: Coe¢ cients on seasonal du mmy variables not rep orted . { denotes endogenous variable; HCS E-t d enotes
t-statistics comp uted u sing White’s correction for heteroscedasticity; Instab denotes Hansen’s (1992) for individual pa-
rameter stability against the null th at the coe¢ cient is stable over the fu ll sample; Lv an d LJ den ote Han sen’s tests for




denote positive and negative deviations from equilibrium
respectively. AR(6) and ARCH(6) denote LM tests against the null of autocorrelation and autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity of order 6; J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera test against the null that the equation error is distributed
normally; Wh ite-H denotes W hite’s test against th e null of homoscedastic errors; Sp denotes Davidson and Mackinnon’s
over-identifying test for the validity of instruments, and DM their test of the e¢ ciency of instruments in the auxiliary
regression.
The dynamic error correction model performs well, reducing the uncon-
ditional standard error of the dependent variable from around 5 per cent per
24month to less than 1.4 percent per month. The standard battery of diag-
nostic tests indicate that the model is free of serious misspeci…cation error.
Hansen’s tests of stability suggest that over the full sample the model o¤ers
a constant-parameter representation of the demand for money, although the
joint-parameter test of stability, LJ; is marginally rejected, re‡ecting in the
main instability in one of the seasonal e¤ects.22
From an economic perspective, the error-correction model accords with
general theoretical priors. The error-correction coe¢cient itself is negative
and signi…cant, suggesting a mean lag adjustment to a shock of around 7
months, slightly slower than corresponding feedback vectors reported in Ta-
bles 7 and 8. The signi…cance of the error-correction coe¢cient supports the
di¤erence-stationary assumptions made above: if the variables had been truly
trend-stationary as opposed to being di¤erence-stationary then the error-
correction coe¢cient would be low and insigni…cant (since the whole of the
trending component would be “di¤erenced away” in the dynamic model).
The second point to notice is that while the short-run income and wealth
elasticities are of a similar order of magnitude to their long-run values, the
short-run interest elasticity is signi…cantly lower than its long-run value (but
remains strongly signi…cant). One possible explanation is that the interest
rate e¤ect is conditional on the presence of ¾¼t, the measure of in‡ation
volatility. Although the collinearity between these variables is low, it is posi-
tive, and eliminating ¾¼t raises the interest e¤ect slightly, albeit at the cost of
lower statistical precision of the model. The signi…cance of ¾¼t indicates that
the private sector economizes on money holdings in the presence of increased
in‡ation volatility. Given the recent history in Chile, the model suggests that
money demand has increased (i.e. velocity has declined) both in response to
the falling rate of in‡ation and also to the increased stability in in‡ation (i.e.
the fall in the variance) that has accompanied the decline in in‡ation.
The second column in Table 9 allows for asymmetric responses to positive
and negative disequilibria. Although, as indicated by the test statistic, I
cannot reject the restriction that the feedback e¤ects are equal it would
appear that the private sector responds slightly more rapidly to negative
shocks (i.e. when agents are holding lower than desired balances) than to
negative ones.
Finally, as noted above, it is not appropriate to treat as weakly exogenous
the contemporaneous values of the scale variables (¢yt and ¢wt) and the
interest rate (¢it). I therefore re-estimate the error-correction model using
an IV estimator which is reported in the …nal column of Table 9. Lagged
22These results are con…rmed by recursive estimation methods, details of which are
available on request.
25values of the three variables plus lagged values of in‡ation were used as
instruments. This implicitly assumes agents adopt a feedback or adaptive
structure for forecasting expected nominal interest rates and income. As
indicated by the over-identifying tests, this characterization appear to be
both valid and e¢cient. In the case of the interest rate and wealth, the
instrumenting process does not substantially alter the estimated coe¢cients
(or their signi…cance): the short-run income elasticity there isa marked fall in
the signi…cance of the income variable As important, though, is that overall
the IV estimation displays the same statistical and forecast properties as the
OLS model which underscores the validity of the particular “partial-system”
strategy adopted in this paper.
3.5 Comparative performance
Finally, to nail down the argument about speci…cation I undertake a simple
within-sample encompassing of the model presented in Table 9 with a similar
dynamic error-correction model without wealth e¤ects as presented in Tables
2 - 5 (allowing for dynamic e¤ects). To do so I report a suite of encompassing
test statistics reported in Table 10. The …rst three rows of the table record
the results of symmetric encompassing tests of the model with wealth (Model
1) versus the model without wealth (Model 2) where the left hand column
is a test of the null than Model 1 encompasses Model 2 and the right hand
column that Model 2 encompasses Model 1. The …nal row (the Joint test )
is an F-test against the null that each model encompasses the joint nesting
model of the two speci…cations.
Table 10: Encompassing Performance
Model 1 2 Model 2 Form Test Form Model 2 2 Model 1
-1.196 N(0,1) Cox N(0,1) -9.522¤¤
1.073 N(0,1) Ericsson IV N(0,1) 7.418¤¤
2.858 Â2(5) Sargan Â2(6) 28.359¤¤
0.562 F(5,122) Joint F(6,122) 5.787¤¤
[0.7291] [0.0000]
In this case the results are unambiguous. For the model estimated over
the sample to 1998(9), the speci…cation including wealth clearly dominates
the baseline model, and decisively encompasses the nested model.
Table 11 concludes this section by reporting the within-sample forecast
performance of the model. The table reports four statistics: the Forecast Â2
is a direct test against the null that the forecast errors are jointly zero and
the Forecast Chow test is an F-test measure of parameter stability between
26the estimation and forecast period. The probability level is reported beside
each. The innovation t test indicates whether there is a systematic bias in the
forecast errors, and the MSFE is the standard mean-square forecast error.
In all cases I report ex ante dynamic forecasts which are conditional on the
actual value of the vector of exogenous and pre-determined variables and
instruments, (and hence the estimated values of the endogenous variables)
over the forecast horizon.
Table 11. Within-Sample Forecast Performance
Estimation Sample 86(7)-94(9) 86(7)-96(9) 86(7)-97(9)
Forecast Horizon 94(10)-98(9) 96(10)-98(9) 97(10)-98(9)
Forecast periods 48 24 12
Forecast Â2 79.855 [0.0026]* 31.418 [0.1412] 14.022 [0.2993]
Forecast Chow Test 1.189 [0.2466] 1.125 [0.3313] 1.019 [0.4359]
Innovation -t 1.756 0.162 -0.598
MSFE (percent) 1.713 1.555 1.485
Although there is some evidence of signi…cant forecast errors over the
four-year horizon, the model exhibits a reasonable degree of stability (note
that the 48-forecast period represents a forecast over almost 30 percent of the
usable sample). It may be noted, however, that the direction of the forecast
errors as measured by the t-statistics suggest that forecasts have moved from
a situation in which the model under-predicts actual real money demand on
average to one where it over-predicts real money on average towards the end
of the period (i.e. the forecast error de…ned as m¡ ^ m is negative). As shall be
seen below this tendency increases with out-of-sample forecast performance.
3.6 Interim summary
The error correction model reported above appears to be relatively well spec-
i…ed, in terms of both its long-run and dynamic characteristics, and exhibits
satisfactory within-sample forecast stability. The restrictions imposed on
the model suggest a relatively simple theory of the aggregate transactions
demand for money where the demand for money is determined by income,
wealth and the nominal domestic interest rate (equivalently by its compo-
nents, the real policy rate and domestic in‡ation). In the long run, the
income and wealth elasticities are around 0.5 and 0.3 respectively, while a
275 percent increase in interest rates (per month) reduces real money demand
in the long run by around one percent. In the short-run, agents respond
rapidly to monetary disequilibrium and also to the volatility of recent in‡a-
tion: in recent years this has worked to the favour of Chile with real money
demand rising not only from lower in‡ation and hence lower nominal interest
rates, but also from the lower variance in in‡ation that has accompanied this
decline in in‡ation.
Although the current speci…cation is robust and relatively simple, a key
test must be its ability to forecast out-of-sample. In the …nal section I return
to this issue.
4 Out-of-sample predictive power
Circumstances in Chile changes dramatically in the second half of 1998 when
the economy moved into a short, sharp recession which saw output fall by 3
percent (considerably more relative to trend) within a single quarter. In nor-
mal circumstances this might be considered as a regular event, but in Chile
this was the …rst downturn in output since 1985 and since the creation of an
independent Central Bank. A well speci…ed money demand function should
be able to predict behaviour accurately through this period. Unfortunately,
however, the preliminary evidence on our preferred model estimated up to
1998 is not encouraging. Using the error correction model presented in Ta-
ble 12 as the basis for out-of-sample forecasting and employing the battery
of forecasting tests from Table 11 it is clear that not only do the statistics
imply a signi…cant rejection of parameter stability but the forecast errors
are systematically negative (i.e. the model systematically over-predicts ac-
tual money demand): the model chronically fails to correctly predict real
money balances (Table 12, column 1). It is certainly true that the perfor-
mance of Equation (6), the Central Bank partial adjustment speci…cation,
shown in column 2, is even worse, but neither can claim much validity as a
speci…cation.23
There are two potential reasons why this model may perform so poorly.
One possibility is that the model may have been “over-…tted” and hence
misspeci…ed: in other words it is so tightly calibrated to the sample data
that it is unable to explain out of sample. Alternatively, the poor forecast
performance re‡ects a structural break, an obvious candidate being the neg-
ative shock to money demand following the stabilization crises in the region
in 1998(re‡ected as an increase in velocity of circulation in Figure 2 above).
23The statistics in column 2 of Table 12 correspond to Figure 3 above.
28Table 12. Out–of-Sample Forecast Performance
Model Table 9 Eq(6) Table 9
(excl ECM)
Estimation Sample 86(7)-98(9) 86(7)-96(9) 86(7)-98(9)
Forecast Horizon 98(10)-2000(6) 98(10)-2000(6) 98(10)-2000(6)
Forecast periods 21 21 21
Forecast Â2 74.241 [0.0000]** 98.184 [0.0000]** 18.993 [0.5856]
Forecast Chow Test 2.584 [0.000]* 2.368 [0.0008]** 0.794 [0.722]
Innovation -t -1.994 -8.481 -0.192
MSFE (x 100) 2.633 3.246 1.935
Clements and Hendry (1998) have suggested, one-o¤ structural breaks or
shocks of this type will lead to systematic forecast failure in error-correction
models if the structural break alters the long-run cointegrating vector. Since
the error correction model embodies a feedback e¤ect, then following such
a shift the error-correction model will exhibit persistent short-term forecast
errors as it tries to “error-correct” towards the old, but inappropriate, long-
run equilibrium. This form of equilibrium-correction error will not, however,
manifest itself in a more conventionally de…ned dynamic models (such as a
VAR) where there is no link between the common-trends and the cointe-
gration components of the model. As can be seen from the third column
of Table 17 simply excluding the error correction term from the model, the
out-of-sample forecast performance of the model signi…cantly improves and
eliminates any bias in the forecast errors. This suggests rather strongly that
the reason for the forecast error in our preferred speci…cation would appear
to reside in a shift in the long-run equilibrium, possibly re‡ecting the jump
in the velocity of circulation in late 1998.
Re-estimating the long-run relationship indicates that there is indeed ev-
idence of parameter instability over the forecast period consistent with the
collapse of the equilibrium demand for money function. However, by the
simple expedient of an intercept-correction (i.e. a dummy variable which
interacts with the constant in the cointegrating vector) to pick-up the shift
in velocity post-1998) I recover the following long-run cointegration results.
29Table 13 Eigenvalues, Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Statistics
Maximal Eigenvalue Trace Statistic
r ¸r ¡(T ¡ nm)ln(1¡ ¸r) 5%c.v. ¡(T ¡ nm)
P
ln(1¡ ¸r) 5%c.v
0 0.5229 106.60** 28.1 181.20** 53.10
1 0.1981 31.79** 22.0 56.88** 34.90
2 0.0806 14.12 15.7 19.78 20.0
3 0.0331 5.66 9.2 5.66 9.2
Statistics reported with Reimers (1992) small sample correction. Critical Values
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m ¡p y w ip c c0
(1) 1.000 -0.350 -0.397 0.569 0.600 0.195
(2) -0.737 1.000 -0.131 0.093 0.327 -0.036
® Loadings (Adjustment/Feedback) Vectors
(1) (2)




The comparison with Table 9 is instructive: with the addition of the
one-o¤ intercept correction (c0) I recover almost exactly the two long-run
relationships identi…ed for the earlier sample.24 Hence I have isolated the
cause of the predictive-failure to an un-modelled increase in the quasi velocity
of circulation around late 1998. Using this revised cointegrating model I
…nally re-estimate the dynamic model over the full sample (Table 14).
24Full details of the re-estimation of the model can be obtained on request from the
author.
30Table 14. Dynamic Error Correction Money Demand Model
Dependent Variable ¢(m¡ p)t. Sample 1986(7) - 2000(6)
Model [1] [2]
OLS IV
Variable Coe¢cient HCSE-t Coe¢cient t-value Instab
Constant -0.101 6.82 -0.099 10.76 0.10
¢(m ¡p)t¡2 -0.264 4.44 -0.249 5.69 0.15
¢(m ¡p)t¡3 -0.169 3.93 -0.155 3.09 0.79*
¢yt 0.362 1.91 0.342{ 1.35 0.16
¢wt 0.341 5.13 0.252{ 2.59 0.74*
¢wt¡2 0.212 3.27 0.217 3.05 0.43
¢i
p
t -0.056 10.96 -0.064{ 10.09 0.42
¢i
p
t¡3 -0.017 3.53 -0.016 3.06 0.03
^ ¸t¡1 -0.109 10.71 -0.113 11.71 0.27
¾¼t -0.393 3.02 -0.309 2.17 0.14
DM0292 0.140 17.16 0.138 14.35 0.14
Dhol 0.004 3.41 0.004 2.88 0.14
R2 0.930
s.e 0.0139 s.e.(SF) 0.014
s.d 0.0528 s.e (RF) 0.016
DW 1.85
Lv 0.227
Lf 5.607* Sp:(18) 19.024
AR(6) 1.74 [0.105] [0.3903]
ARCH(6) 0.88 [0.524]
White-H 0.83 [0.716] DM:(21) 1815.1
J-B 0.57 [0.751] [0.000]
Notes: See Table 9.
Table 15. Within-Sample Forecast Performance (Full-Sample Model)
Estimation Sample 86(7)-96(6) 86(7)-98(6) 86(7)-99(6)
Forecast Horizon 96(7)-2000(6) 98(7)-2000(6) 99(7)-2000(6)
Forecast periods 48 24 12
Forecast Chow Test 0.9005 [0.6509] 0.7627 [0.7755] 0.7147 [0.7086]
Innovation -t -0.221 -1.103 1.103
MSFE (x 100) 1.491 1.342 1.163
31This dynamic model indicates how closely the basic model has been re-
covered once the levels-correction is embodied. Not only are the coe¢cients
of the dynamic model statistically indistinguishable from those reported
in columns [1] and [3] of Table 9 but the forecast stability of this model
(within-sample this time) is now restored (see Table 15).This robust within-
sample forecast evidence is fully consistent with the recursive estimation of
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5 Conclusions
The econometric evidence presented in this paper suggests that although
macroeconomic time-seriesin Chileexhibita strongdegree of trend-stationarity
32it is possible to recover a relatively simple but robust single-equation model
for the transactions demand for money which exhibits good out-of-sample
properties. The error-correction speci…cation exhibits signi…cantly better
within-sample forecast accuracy than the partial adjustment model in use
by the Central Bank, partly due to the superiority of this class of model in
the presence of cointegration, and partly because of the use of a measure of
in‡ation volatility as a regressor. Moreover once account had been taken for
an apparent permanent shift if the velocity of circulation in 1998, the out-
of-sample forecast performance was good and the systematic forecast errors
present in the partial adjustment model for the period appear to have been
eliminated.
Having said this, however, there are two areas of concern which mean that
the model remains tentative and which point to future extensions. The …rst
is that the out-of-sample forecast results were obtained only after imposing
an ‘intercept-correction’ to the long-run money demand function. Given the
limitations of the data sample it is not possible at this stage to determine
whetherthe sharp rise in velocity fromthe…nal quarterof 1998 isatemporary
or permanent feature of the data. As more data become available it will
be necessary to re-investigate this event and reconsider the nature of the
long-run demand function. The second related area of research concerns
the appropriate measurement of wealth. The measure of wealth used in this
paper is extremely crude and certainly does not capture wealth e¤ects arising
from either the accumulation of non-…nancial assets, such as housing, or from
other …nancial assets such as pensions and life insurance. E¤orts should
therefore be directed towards the compilation of a comprehensive measure of
private sector real wealth. Finally, and building on this, one …nal direction
for research involves broadening the scope of the analysis to examine the
demand for interest-bearing …nancial assets, since it here that the analysis
of …nancial innovation and wealth e¤ects are likely to be of much greater
importance.
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356 Appendix I: Data and unit root tests
The data are derived from the Central Bank’s Informe Economico y Financiero
(various issues).
Appendix Table 1. Data and Sources
Variable Description Symbol Source
M 1A M oney stock M1A M1A IEF Table 12
L RM1A L og real money stock M1A (m¡ p) ln(
M1A
CPI89)
M 4 M oney stock M4 IEF Table 12
FXD Foreign currency dep osits Research Dept
NCRED Credit to private sector IMF IFS Tables line 32
RNW Real net … nancial wealth w
M4+FXD¡NCRED
CPI89
L IM AE L og in dicator of monthly economic activity y IEF-Table 1
L IM AEX L IM AE excluding agricu lture and cop per y
CPI89 Consumer price index p IEF Table 21
INFLM CPI in‡ation ¼
pt¡pt¡1
pt¡1
NER Nominal exchange rate e IEF Table 23
DEPR Depreciation of nominal exchange rate IEF Table 23
TEP Real p olicy rate (TEP) ir
IEF Table 19
PNBC Nominal policy rate ip
IEF Table 19
RDSM Nominal short-term dep osit rate (30-90 days) id
IEF Table 20
Appendix Table 2: Unit Root Tests: 1985(1) - 2000(6) T=186
Test ADF[1] ADF[1] PP[1,2] PP[1,2] KPSS[1,3] KPSS[1,3] DF F[1,4,5]
Null: H0 I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1)
Variable with d rift with trend with drift with trend with drift with trend sequ ence
LRM1A -2.689 -0.169 -1.292 -3.907 3.693 0.143 I(0)+trend
LRNW -2.792 -1.517 -4.899 -1.143 3.114 0.899 I(0)+trend
LIM AE -1.343 -1.003 -1.020 -9.178 3.555 0.218 I(0)+trend
LIM AEX -1.107 -1.963 -1.322 -11.226 3.577 0.332 I(0)+trend
CPI89 -0.948 0.896 -0.714 -1.286 3.705 0.962 I(1)+d rift
INFL M -2.157 -6.551 -7.336 -9.683 2.391 0.136 I(0)+cnst
NER -0.644 -1.939 -1.731 -3.782 3.508 0.812 I(1)+d rift
DEPR -7.757 -7.923 -9.331 -9.710 0.773 0.137 I(0)+cnst
TEP -3.406 -3.716 -2.387 -2.836 0.961 0.115 I(0)+cnst
PNBC -2.437 -3.416 -5.739 -5.637 4.723 0.382 I(0)+cnst
crit.val -2.88 -3.44 -2.88 -3.44 0.463 0.146
Notes: [1] Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) with lag-length selected by min imum Aikaike Information Criterion.
M onth ly d ummy variables included in each test. [2] Phillip s-Perron (PP) tests estimated with Newy-West correction.
[3] Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt an d Shin test against null of station arity. [4] DF-t and DF-F tests estimated using
Ph illips-Perron non-p arametric correction. [5] Inference based on Dolad o et al (1990) reduction sequence.
367 Appendix II: Alternative speci…cations
The own return on money The dimension of the vector X is four, with










generatingrestricted cointegrating vectorsand associated likelihood ratiotest
on the restriction.
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m ¡ p y ip id c
(1) 1.000 -1.000 0.284 -0.171 -0.539
(2) -0.900 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(3) 0.000 0.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000
LR Test (r=3) Â2(3) = 6:975 [0.0727]
In‡ation and the real interest rate Re-estimating the model with in-
‡ation and the real interest rate generates two cointegrating vectors
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m ¡ p y ¼ rp c
(1) 1.000 -0.961 0.335 0.407 -0.031
(2) -0.966 1.000 -0.095 0.021 0.008
Imposing the symmetry restriction ¯¼ = ¯rp; I obtain the following re-
stricted eigenvectors and associated likelihood ratio test.
¯
0 Eigenvectors [Normalized on Diagonal]
m ¡p y ¼ rp cnst
(1) 1.000 -1.000 0.145 0.145 -0.779
(2) -0.898 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR Test against restriction (r=2) is Â2(3) = 6:126 [0.1056]
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